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The National Employment Lawyers Association
("NELA’) is the only professional membership organiza-
tion in the country comprised of lawyers who represent
employees in labor, employment and civil rights disputes.
NELA and its 67 state and local affiliates have a member-
ship of over 3,000 attorneys who are committed to working
on behalf of those who have been illegally treated in the
workplace. NELA strives to protect the rights of its mem-
bers’ clients, and regularly supports precedent-setting
litigation affecting the rights of individuals in the work-
place. NELA advocates for employee rights and workplace
fairness while promoting the highest standards of profes-
sionalism, ethics and judicial integrity.
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. ("LDF") is a non-profit corporation established under
the laws of the State of New York, formed to redress
injustice caused by racial discrimination and to assist
African-Americans in securing their constitutional and
statutory rights. For over six decades, LDF attorneys have
represented parties in litigation before this Court and
other federal courts on matters of race discrimination in
general, and employment discrimination in particular.
Marianne Sawicki is the petitioner in Sawicki v.
Morgan State University, et al., No. 06-603, now pending
before this Court. The question presented in Sawicki is
essentially the same as the question presented in the
1 Counsel for amici authored this brief in its entirety. No person or
entity other than amici, their staff, or their counsel made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Letters of
consent to the filing of this brief have been filed with the Clerk of the
Court pursuant o Supreme Court Rule 37.3.
instant case. Ms. Sawicki’s Title VII claim was dismissed
by the lower courts applying the ultimate decisionmaker
standard adopted for the Fourth Circuit in Hill v. Lock-
heed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir.
2004) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 543 U.S. 1132 (2005).
Petitioner in the instant case is urging this Court to adopt
the rule in Hill.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The employer in this case, as commonly occurs, took
certain personnel actions as the result of a "chain of
decision_making" (Pet. Br. 44). In that decisionmaking
process several BCI officials played distinct roles and were
allocated responsibility for making different types of
decisions.
Whether an employee who plays a role in a decision-
making process acts as an agent of the employer is gov-
erned by traditional agency law principles. The conduct of
an official is properly imputed to his or her employer when
the official "exercises the authority actually delegated to
him by his employer." Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70 (1986). Grado was doing precisely
that when he carried out the established responsibility of a
BCI supervisor to select which potential disciplinary
matters to raise with the human resources department,
and when he "presented the facts" to that department.
Employer liability is not limited to the conduct of the
last decisionmaker in a chain of decisionmaking, the so-
called "ultimate decisionmaker." In the case of a termina-
tion, that last decisionmaker - in this case the one who
selected termination as the sanction - is not the only, or
necessarily the most important, decisionmaking agent.
"Agency principles [impose] vicarious liability for harm
caused by misuse of supervisory authority." Burlington
Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). That
principle is equally applicable regardless of when in the
decisionmaking process the misuse of authority occurs.
The far different "ultimate decisionmaker" standard
proposed by petitioner, and adopted by the Fourth Circuit,
has - as a district judge in that circuit recently observed -
"the unfortunate potential to create a safe harbor for
workplace discrimination."
A plaintiff must demonstrate that an improperly
motivated official, acting as an agent of his or her em-
ployer, took some act that caused the dismissal or other
injury complained of. That improperly motivated act must
be a but-for cause; it must have had "a determinative
influence on the outcome" of the decisionmaking process.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S.
131, 141 (2000).
Neither a showing that the ultimate decisionmaker
made an "independent judgment" about the facts pre-
sented by other officials, nor evidence that that decision-
maker undertook an "independent investigation" of the
facts, will necessarily preclude in every case a finding that
the invidiously motivated act caused the injury com-
plained of. The exculpatory evidence proffered by an
employer to show that a disputed adverse action was not
caused by an earlier discriminatory act must specifically
address the particular type of discriminatory act taken,
and the manner in which that act assertedly brought
about the adverse action.
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I. UNDER AGENCY PRINCIPLES EMPLOYERS
ARE LIABLE FOR THE CONDUCT OF EM-
PLOYEES IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR AU-
THORITY
This is a case about agency law. "[T]he courts have
consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory
discharges of employees by supervisory personnel." Meri-
tor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986).
"[T]here is nothing remarkable in the fact that claims
against employers for discriminatory actions ... like ...
firing ... have resulted in employer liability once the
discrimination is shown." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 790 (1998).
Employer liability for a discriminatory discharge is an
unremarkable application of the established agency
principle that an employer is liable when its employee
uses, or abuses, his or her authority. "[T]he supervisor acts
within the scope of this authority when he makes dis-
criminatory decisions in... firing .... "Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 791. "[A] supervisory employee who fires a subordinate
is doing the kind of thing that he is authorized to do, and
the wrongful intent with which he does it does not carry
his behavior so beyond the orbit of his responsibilities as
to excuse the employer." Shager v. Up john Co., 913 F.3d
398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
That principle is not limited to dismissals or any other
particular type of official act. Regardless of the type of
authority wielded by an official, "[i]t is well established
that traditional vicarious liability rules make principals or
employers vicariously liable for the acts of their agents or
employee in the scope of their authority." Meyer v. Holley,
537 U.S. 250, 285 (2003); see Karibian v. Columbia Uni-
versity, 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir.) (employer liable where
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supervisor "wields the employer’s authority"), cert. denied,
512 U.S. 1213 (1994); 2 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, The
Law of Torts 24 (2d ed. 1956) (employer liable when "the
servant is engaged in performing what he is hired to do").
"[W]here a supervisor exercises the authority actually
delegated to him by his employer, by making decisions...
affecting the employment status of his subordinates, such
actions are properly imputed to the employer whose
delegation of authority empowered the supervisor to make
them." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70. ~[T]he employer is vicari-
ously liable for ... company acts that can be performed
only by the exercise of specific authority granted by the
employer." Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
768 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Such authority 
power, "once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift
when it is wrongfully used." Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 392 (1971).
The Restatement of Agency, in its various iterations,
has embraced this rule. The Second Restatement of
Agency states that an employer is liable for the torts of an
agent where the agent "was aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency relation." (Restatement
(Second) of Agency, § 219(2)(d).) The Third Restatement
provides that an employer is liable for torts committed by
employees "within the scope of employment," and defines
scope of employment to mean "performing work assigned
by the employer." (Restatement (Third) of Agency, §7.07).2
2 The action of an employee would be part of "an independent
course of conduct," and thus outside his or her assigned uties, only if
that conduct "represents a departure from, not an escalation of, conduct
involved in performing assigned work" Section 7.07, comment b.
(Continued on following page)
Whatever differences may exist between these two articu-
lations, they both embrace the rule long applied by this
Court that an employer is liable for the conduct of its
agent in exercising his or her official authority. That rule
encompasses both authority in the sense of the power to
direct the actions of others (e.g., to tell the personnel
department whether to stop paying a worker) and author-
ity in the sense of delegation of the responsibility to act in
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the drafters of the Third
Restatement, writing forty-two years after the adoption of Title VII,
chose to omit the "aided in" language that was contained in the Second
Restatement and that was relied on by this Court in Ellerth and
Faragher. (Pet. Br. 42). This change, however, is expressly limited 
the standard of vicarious liability "for a tort committed by an agent in
dealing or communicating with a third party." Restatement (Third) 
Agency § 7.08. The comment to section 7.07 explains that the Restate-
ment’s analysis of tort liability to third parties "is inapplicable to an
employer’s liability for one employee’s tortious conduct oward a fellow
employee, a topic being considered by the Restatement... Employment
Law, in preparation as the Restatement, Third, Agency was completed."
To the extent that the drafters of the Third Restatement decided to
omit the "aided in" standard in the Second Restatement, that is of no
significance to the meaning of Title VII. The Second Restatement
described prevailing law when it was adopted in 1958, and remained
unquestioned for four decades after the enactment of Title VII. In
directing that agency principles be applied to determine the scope of
employer liability under Title VII, Congress did not intend to give to the
members of the American Law Institute authority to promulgate, and
change at will, legal standards accorded the great weight of federal
regulations under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The drafters candidly acknowledged
that for years the ~aided in" standard in section 219(2)(d) of the Second
Restatement was ’~idely" construed in a literal manner. Restatement
(Third) of Agency, § 7.08, Rptrs. Note b. The fact that the drafters (or, 
least, the reporter) of the Third Restatement in 2006 feared that this
widespread view of agency law would unduly expose employers to
vicarious liability does not retroactively change the prevailing agency
law on which Congress relied in enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
the name of the employer (e.g., to decide whether to
reimburse an employee for a claimed business expense).
Where a company official, acting with an unlawful
purpose, uses his or her authority to dismiss an employee
or take some other official action, the courts have held the
employer liable without regard to why the official chose to
discriminate on the basis of race, gender, national origin,
age, disability, or other prohibited characteristic. Specifi-
cally, a plaintiff who has been the victim of a discrimina-
tory official action is not required to prove that the official
involved believed that that discrimination was somehow in
the interests of the employer. Doubtless it is frequently the
case that a biased official believes that employees of a
particular race, gender, or age are inferior workers, but
proof of such a belief is not necessary to establish employer
liability for the exercise of official authority. Under
Faragher and Ellerth, for example, an employer is strictly
liable if a supervisor dismisses a subordinate because she
spurned his sexual advances, even though the supervisor
in doing so would be acting for "personal motives, motives
unrelated and even antithetical to the objectives of the
employer." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 776.
The application of this principle is easy in a case in
which a disputed employment action, such as a dismissal,
was solely the result of a single decision. But, except for
very small employers, employment actions are more often
the result of a number of discrete decisions that may
involve two or more different officials, each authorized to
play a distinct role. This Court has repeatedly recognized
that employers, rather than leaving decisions (particularly
important decisions such as promotions and dismissals) to
the exercise of ad hoc discretion, frequently utilize instead
some sort of structured "decisionmaking process." Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137, 141
(2000) (plaintiff dismissed by company president based 
recommendations of and information from three supervi-
sors); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 236, 248
(1989) (partnership denied by Policy Board after comments
by numerous partners and recommendation by Admissions
Committee); see Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250, 252 (1980) (tenure denied by Board of Trustees based 
recommendation of tenure committee and Faculty Senate).
Petitioner aptly characterizes such processes as involving a
"chain of decisionmaking." (Pet. Br. 44).
Litigation in this Court and the lower courts illus-
trates the range of distinct decisions that, taken in con-
cert, may lead to the dismissal of an employee:
(1) the adoption of rules regarding employee
conduct, disciplinary procedures, and/or
sanctions to be imposed,
(2) the initiation of the disciplinary process,
(3) assembling the body of information on the
basis of which action will be taken,
(4) factual determinations,
(5) determinations as to whether the facts 
found violate the employer’s rules,
(6) recommendations regarding factual deter-
re:nations, applicability of employer rules, or
the appropriate sanction to be imposed, and
(7) the selection of the sanction to be imposed:
Any of these decisions can be among "the kind[s] of
thing[s] that [an official] is authorized to do," Shager, 913
F.2d at 405, and a decisionmaking process simply could
not function unless at least most of these responsibilities
were given to some official or officials. Employers are free
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to divide responsibility for these different decisions be-
tween or among any number of officials and employees.3
Each of these actions involves a distinct decision; thus
a single employment action (e.g., a dismissal) may involve
several different decisionmakers each dealing with differ-
ent aspects of the process. Petitioner stresses that Edgar
was "the decisionmaker’; that is correct in the sense that
it was Edgar who made the decision to select dismissal
(rather than, for example, suspension or demotion) as the
sanction to be imposed. But Grado, too, made several key
decisions; for example, it was Grado, and he alone, who
decided to bring this entire matter to the attention of the
Phoenix office - the only office, according to BCI, which
could select dismissal as a decision.
In determining whether an employer is legally
responsible for a particular decision in a chain of deci-
sionmaking, the usual agency standards apply. For exam-
ple, if a personnel recommendation were made by a
company’s president, the employer would be legally
responsible, since such a high-ranking official is deemed
an alter ego of the employer. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758
(citing Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 219(2)(a)). 
making personnel recommendations was among the duties
of a supervisor, human resources official or other em-
ployee, that employee’s exercise of that authority would be
an act of the employer. Conversely, if an employee who
made an unsolicited recommendation (that, for example,
a co-worker be fired) had no responsibility for making
3 BriefAmicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council,
14 (’~Large employers often delegate initial investigations of workplace
misconduct to local human resources personnel, who in turn report
their findings to a more senior manager who may work in a different
city or state.F).
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personnel recommendations, and did not act for the
purpose (however misguided) of advancing the employer’s
interest, the employer would not be responsible for that
recommendation or for a possibly invidious motive behind
it. Similarly, an employer which decides not to hire an
applicant because of the adverse recommendation of a
former employer is not liable (at least absent some form of
negligence on its own part) if that third party’s negative
report was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
In the instant case, a reasonable trier of fact could
certainly conclude that Grado was carrying out his official
duties when he took the actions which led to Peters’
dismissal. First, bringing personnel problems to the
attention of the human resources department was clearly
among Grado’s official duties. As BCI itself stipulated,
"Mr. Grado was responsible for monitoring the employees
working under his supervision, and when an employee had
an attendance, performance, and/or disciplinary issue, he
was responsible for bringing the issue to the attention of
the BCI Human Resources Department. "~ Second, when a
disciplinary matter was under consideration by the BCI
human resources department, it was the responsibility of
the relevant manager - here Grado - to "present the facts"
to the human resources official. Pederson explained that
as a human resources official she would "rely on manage-
ment to give me th[e] facts ’~ and made decisions based on
4 Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" (p. 2), p. 4; see
Declaration of Patricia Edgar, par. 2; Declaration of Cesar Grado, par. 8,
17; Declaration of Sherry Pederson, par. 2; Pet. Br. 5 ("under BCI’s...
system .... BCI supervisors such as Grado brought issues regarding
employee discipline to the attention of Pederson [and] Edgar.").
5 Pederson Deposition, p. 31.
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"the facts presented to me" by the supervisor. ~ Grado
described the role of a supervisor in similar terms. "I
gather the facts and I present them to our HR department
¯.. I will put the facts in front of HR ... I would present
the facts to HR."7 Third, there was substantial evidence
that it was Grado (not Edgar) who on behalf of BCI made
the critical (and incorrect) decision that Peters was not
actually sick on September 30.8 Clearly a decision as to
what factual inferences an employer will draw from a body
of information is "an official act of the enterprise, a com-
pany act," Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762, requiring the exercise
of delegated authority.
Regardless of whether Grado was biased, BCI objects
that other company officials made a serious effort to
prevent supervisors like Grado from engaging in racial
discrimination. Human resources officials educated the
workforce about Title VII, circulated anti-discrimination
policies, and trained personnel such as Edgar to avoid
discrimination. (Pet. Br. 33). But to the extent that Grado
was using his official authority or otherwise carrying out
his official responsibilities, Grado was as much an agent of
8 Pederson Declaration, par. 11; see Pet. Br. 15 (Edgar acted on the
basis of "the facts presented to her.").
Grado Deposition, pp. 31-32.
8 In a letter dated July 12, 2002, to the EEOC, Edgar (writing on
behalf of BCI) stated:
Respondents attendance policy states that misrepresenting
a reason for absence is dishonesty and grounds for immedi-
ate termination. As a result of Mr. Peters’ actions, Mr. Grado
reached the reasonable conclusion that he had simply de-
cided not to work as scheduled.
(Letter of Patricia Edgar ~o Geraldine Herrera, July 12, 2002, p. 2)
(Exhibit B to the EEOC Response in Opposition to Defendanfs Motion
for Summary Judgment).
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BCI as Edgar or the head of the human resources depart-
ment. Agency law imposes strict liability on an employer
for the conduct of all of its agents, in part because doing so
creates a greater incentive than the negligence standard
urged by petitioner. W. Seavey, Handbook of the Law of
Agency, 141 (1984).9
Petitioner argues that "BCI could not have done
anything more to comply with the statute." (Pet. Br. 14).
But there was, of course, more that Grado could have
done; he could have chosen not to discriminate on the
basis of race. What petitioner means is that, even if BCI
supervisors or managers engaged in invidious discrimina-
tion, there was nothing more that the BCI human re-
sources department could have done to prevent those
violations. But whether the human resources department
did all it could is beside the point; Title VII applies to all of
BCI’s officials, not just to its personnel workers. Agency
law imposes on a principal liability for the actions of its
agents because the principal, having retained those agents
to conduct its business and standing to profit from their
activities, can in return fairly be held responsible for the
injuries inflicted by those agents in the course of their
activities. 1° At BCI profits are generated, not by the human
resources personnel, but by operational managers like
9 5 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, The Law of Torts, § 26.3, p. 15
(2d ed. 1986) ("Pressure of legal liability on the employer therefore 
pressure put in the right place to avoid accidents. This reasoning has
nothing to do with fault. It is true of course that liability based on a
finding of the master’s fault will put pressure on the employer to be
careful. But the imposition of strict liability on an employer will exert
even greater pressure .... ").
10 W. Seavey, Handbook f the Law of Agency, 141 (1984); 5 Harper,
James & Gray, supra, § 26.5, p. 17; D. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 908
(2OOO).
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Grado, who actually solicit sales and deliver product, or
who supervise those BCI employees who do. Grado is a
profit center; Edgar is just overhead.
Finally, BCI complains that it would be impractical to
oversee the activities, and detect any misconduct by, its
thousands of employees, scattered as they are over a
substantial number of states. (Pet. Br. 45). But it is the
very purpose of agency law to impose responsibility and
liability of that magnitude on principals that decide to hire
a great number of agents in order to engage in a large
commercial or other enterprise. BCI Coca-Cola is a sub-
sidiary of Coca-Cola Enterprises, a multi-billion dollar
corporation with vast assets and operations. The founders
of that enterprise were not obligated to expand in this way,
or to hire countless officials - like Grado - to staff an
exceptionally successful corporate empire. The successors
of Atlanta pharmacist Dr. John Pemberton, who invented
Coca-Cola and originally brewed it in a kettle in his
backyard, could have chosen instead only to make and
deliver the beverage themselves; by doing so they could
have avoided any need to supervise far flung subordinates,
and any risk of liability for misconduct by persons other
than themselves. Neither the owners of the very different
and far more lucrative enterprise that emerged, nor
subsidiaries like BCI, can justly complain if the magnitude
of the vast operations that generate great income brings
with it a commensurate degree of legal responsibility and
potential liability.
II. EMPLOYER LIABILITY IS NOT LIMITED TO
THE ACTIONS OF THE LAST AGENT IN-
VOLVED IN A CHAIN OF DECISIONMAKING
Petitioner urges this Court to adopt a novel and quite
extraordinary rule of agency law: when injury is sustained
14
as the result of a chain of decisionmaking by company
officials, only the official who made the last decision is an
agent of the employer. BCI frames this proposed rule
somewhat opaquely, asserting that solely the "actual,"
"formal," or "true" decisionmaker is the agent of the
employer. (Pet. Br. 20, 23, 47). The Fourth Circuit has
aptly labeled this standard as requiring a discriminatory
purpose on the part of "the ultimate decision_maker."
Martin v. Mecklenburg County, 151 Fed. Appx. 275, 280
(4th Cir. 2005). A chain of decisionmaking usually involves
several decisionmakers. Petitioner’s contention is that
where a series of decisions, by several decisionmakers,
result in the dismissal of an employee, only the last
decision - to impose the sanction of dismissal - is legally
"relevant." (Pet. Br. 15).
When BCI insists that Grado had no decisionmaking
authority, ’1 it is not denying that Grado had the power to
make and actually made several decisions, e.g., the deci-
sion to call Edgar, the decision to provide certain informa-
tion, the decision to not respond to Katt’s phone calls, etc.
Rather, BCI is asserting that only Edgar, and not Grado,
had the power to make a particular decision, the decision
to select dismissal - rather than, say, a suspension, or
demotion, or a letter of reprimand - as the sanction to be
imposed on Peters. Thus, BCI contends, when an employee
is dismissed, only the official selecting that sanction acts
as an agent of the employer.
There is simply nothing in agency law that supports
this peculiar limitation on who is an agent. Petitioner’s
summary of argument opens with a straightforward
assertion of agency law. "[P]rinciples of agency law.,, look
~1 Pet. Br. 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 28, 40, 43.
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to the employee who has ’principal responsibility’ for the
relevant employment decision. Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)." (Pet. Br. 14). But the quoted
phrase "principal responsibility" does not appear any-
where in the decision in Ellerth; indeed, this apparently
pivotal quotation never reappears anywhere in petitioner’s
brief at all.
Later, petitioner asserts that
[a]n employer may be liable for the conduct of its
agents acting within the scope of their actual author-
ity, or, specifically, when an adverse employment ac-
tion is taken by its formal decisionmaker with
discriminatory animus. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFAGENCY, §§ 2.04, 7.03(2)
(Pet. Br. 19) (Emphasis added). But whether an agent 
utilizing his or her authority (as was Grado) emphatically
is not the same thing (petitioner uses the phrase "or,
specifically" to suggest an equivalence) as whether an
agent made the "formal" decision (i.e., the last decision, to
impose dismissal as a sanction). (Equating the two stan-
dards in this manner is like saying "The permissibility of
using a designated hitter is governed by the rules for the
American League, or, specifically, the rules for the Na-
tional League.") Neither the phrase "formal decision-
maker," nor the proposed equation of these two very
different standards, is anywhere to be found in Faragher
or the cited sections of the Restatement.
Petitioner’s proposal that only the person who "for-
mal[ly]" takes an employment action is the employer’s
agent would largely override established agency princi-
ples. On this view, so long as Edgar selected dismissal as
the sanction to be imposed on Peters, no one else involved
in the decisionmaking process could be considered an
16
agent of BCI. Those other decisionmakers would not be
acting as BCI agents even if a decision to refer for disci-
pline only blacks who object to Sunday work had been
made by the BCI board of directors, or if a pretextual
finding that Peters was loafing on September 30 (rather
than actually sick) had been made by BCI’s president.1~
Under that same approach, BCI would not be liable in tort
if Grado had an accident while driving a delivery truck he
knew had defective brakes, so long as it was Edgar who
made the final decision to permit use of the truck and
Grado had never told Edgar that the brakes did not work.
If this standard were adopted by this Court as a
general rule of agency law, the ramifications would reach
far beyond Title VII. The United States Code is replete
with provisions whose applicability depends (like certain
Title VII claims) on the existence of a particular intent or
purpose. (Westlaw reports that more than 3,000 federal
provisions use the term "intent.") Insofar as these laws
apply to corporations, government bodies, or other entities
Petitioner repeatedly argues that it should not be liable for
discriminatory conduct by a "subordinate" official in the decisionmaking
chain. (Pet. Br. 15, 16, 28, 29, 32, 43, 45, 47). But the logic of BCI’s
argument is fully applicable regardless of whether the earlier partici-
pants in that chain of events outranked Edgar.
In this case it is not clear in what sense, if any, Grado was the
"subordinate." The record does not suggest that Edgar was Grado’s
supervisor, that she outranked him in some company system of job
grades, that she supervised a larger number of actual subordinates, or
that she was paid more than he was. This is, rather, a situation in
which Edgar and Grado had been given different responsibilities within
BCI and different roles to play in a disciplinary matter.
In the armed forces, the court martial convening authority will
Usually outrank the officers, and will always outrank any non-
commissioned officers, who sit on the court martial panel and deter-
mine guilt and punishment.
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of any size, their effectiveness and even viability would be
substantially impaired if the only intent that mattered
was the motive of the employee who made the last, formal
decision in a decisionmaking chain. If, for example, super-
visors at a government contractor prepared lavishly
exaggerated statements of expenses and wrote up charges
for costly but non-existent services, the False Claims Act
would not be violated so long as the accountant who
finalized and submitted the bill to the United States did
not know what was going on. A wide range of statutes that
govern the rights of corporations and legal relations
among them - copyright, patent, securities, anti-trust,
trade and other laws - would be seriously affected. It is
perhaps for that reason that the National Chamber of
Commerce does not endorse the extraordinary agency rule
proposed by BCI, but insists instead that an employer is
responsible for the misuse of any "delegated authority" by
a company official.18
In the instant case, BCI contends that Grado accu-
rately reported to Edgar what was occurring in the Albu-
querque office. But on petitioner’s view, it would not have
mattered if Grado was lying through his teeth. BCI insists
that it would not be liable even if what really happened
was that Peters happily agreed to the requests from Katt
and Grado that he work over the weekend, that Peters in
fact put in a full day’s work on Sunday, and that Grado
nonetheless used his official position to sell Edgar a
completely different story fabricated by Grado because he
believed African-Americans are racially inferior. Similarly,
if Grado acting for such an invidious purpose submitted
18 Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America sAmicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 4, 16, 18, 20, 21.
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time or sales records for Peters that understated the hours
he had worked or the amount of sales for which he had
earned commissions, on petitioner’s view BCI would not be
liable so long as the officials in the payroll department
who underpaid Peters did not know that they were receiv-
ing inaccurate information.
The sole exception suggested by BCI to its proposed
"formal decisionmaker" rule is an equally strange depar-
ture from agency law. An employer would be legally
responsible for the motives of any person who had such
"leverage or influence" that he could "impose his will" on
or "dupe" the formal decisionmaker. (Pet. Br. 24). 14 Under
BCI’s theory, agency could be established by showing that
some such other person had an overbearing personality
(like the influence of the monk Grigori Rasputin over Tsar
14 Petitioner also argues that Edgar was not Grado’s "cat’s paw."
(Pet. Br. 14, 15, 23, 24, 28).
The charming fable at issue, created in the seventh century B.C. by
the Greek writer Aesop, and put into verse by the seventeenth century
French poet Jean de La Fontaine, has outlived its usefulness as a guide
to the meaning of twenty-first century agency law.
In the Aesop fable, a monkey and a cat observe chestnuts roasting
on a fire in the home of their owner. The monkey persuades the cat to
pull the chestnuts from the fire, promising to share the chestnuts and
flattering the cat with compliments about his feline dexteri~ The cat
(after an independent evaluation of the circumstances) is persuaded 
the monkey, and pulls chestnuts from the fire, singeing his paw in the
process. Unfortunately for the cat, he (like Edgar in dealing with
Grado) had misjudged the motives of the monkey. While the cat is
taking the chestnuts from the fire, the monkey eats them all.
Nothing that occurs in the employment context bears any resem-
blance to the tactics used by the monkey in this story. Supervisors do
not persuade personnel officials to fire workers by promising to share
some sort of bonus that the supervisor will receive as a result of the
dismissal; employers do not provide financial rewards for adverse
employment actions.
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Nicholas II), wove a hypnotic trance (like the evil Svengali
in George Du Maurier’s nineteenth century novel Trilby),
or used trickery to bamboozle the formal decisionmaker
(as did Delilah in persuading Samson to disclose the
source of his great strength.) It apparently would not
matter, however, whether this other highly influential
person was not an employee of the defendant. On the other
hand, traditional agency considerations, such as delegated
job responsibilities, the exercise of official power, or an
intent to serve one’s employer, could not be relied on to
show that any other person was acting as an agent.
Unsurprisingly, BCI does not point to anything in any
version of the Restatement of Agency supporting such
distinctions.
This proposed limitation on agency-based liability
cannot be reconciled with the past decisions of this Court.
In both Ellerth and Faragher this Court expressly ac-
knowledged and applied the "agency principle[] of vicari-
ous liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory
authority." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (emphasis added);
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added); see Meritor,
477 U.S. at 70 (employer liable for use of delegated author-
ity "affecting the employment status" of a worker) (empha-
sis added). Reeves reiterated that a discrimination plaintiff
can prevail by demonstrating that an impermissible
consideration "actually played a role in [the employer’s
decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influ-
ence on the outcome." 530 U.S. at 141 (quoting Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (bracketed
material in Reeves)).
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900
(1989) illustrates the principle that employer liability 
not limited to situations in which the person actually
2O
taking the adverse action acted with a discriminatory
purpose. In Lorance the plaintiffs were demoted in 1982 as
a result of the application of a seniority rule that had been
adopted in 1979. There was no claim that the company
officials who in 1982 actually ordered the demotion had
themselves acted with an unlawful purpose; the alleged
discriminatory purpose was on the part of earlier company
and union negotiators who drafted the facially neutral
seniority rule. Under BCrs view of agency law, the benign
purpose of the 1982 demotion decision (taken by the
"formal decisionmaker’) would by itself have barred any
Title VII claim; the earlier invidiously motivated rule
adoption would have been legally irrelevant. This Court,
however, agreed that the plaintiffs would have been
entitled to relief if the invidiously motivated seniority rule
had itself been the subject of a timely Title VII charge. 490
U.S. at 906-13.
Nothing like the rule proposed by petitioner exists in
analogous areas of anti-discrimination law. If a govern-
ment employee was targeted for discipline because he was
African-American and found guilty of misconduct because
he was a Baptist, no one would seriously claim that his
dismissal was nonetheless constitutional because the
official who then imposed the sanction of dismissal did not
know what was going on. Similarly, if a defendant had
been arrested by a biased police officer because he was
Hispanic, indicted by a biased prosecutor because he was
Catholic, and convicted by a biased jury because his
parents were from Mexico, the defendant’s resulting
imprisonment would violate equal protection - and could
be successfully challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding -
regardless of whether the sentencing judge was personally
unaware of those earlier discriminatory acts.
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BCI’s insistence on focusing solely on the last decision
- in a dismissal case the decision to select termination as
the sanction - makes little practical sense. In many
situations that "formal decision" may be little more than a
formality. In the instant case, for example, BCI’s human
resources officials insisted that their role was limited to (1)
determining whether the "facts presented" by manage-
ment constituted a violation of some BCI rule, and (2)
determining what sanction was required for that particu-
lar violation. 15 BCI argues that the facts presented to
Edgar clearly constituted flagrant insubordination, and
that dismissal was the obvious penalty for such insubordi-
nation. Once Grado had decided to take the matter up
with the Phoenix office, and "presented" the "facts" regard-
ing the events of September 28-30, the result may well
have been virtually a foregone conclusion. Similarly, in
Lorance the "formal decisioumakers" who demoted the
plaintiffs both properly and predictably applied the rele-
vant rules to the circumstances before them; the critical
decisions had been made by others several years earlier.
The agency rule proposed by BCI permits an employer
to place largely outside the reach of Title VII almost all of
the decisions leading to an adverse employment action.
The employer cotfld generally do so by giving responsibil-
ity for the "ultimate," sanction-fLxing decision to an official
who personally has no other role in the decisionmaking
15 Declaration of Cesar Grado, par. 6 ("I bring the facts relating to
the matter to the attention of our Human Resources Department. The
Human Resources representative then makes the decision about which
company policy or policies applies in the situation, if any, and the
appropriate action to take based upon what has occurred."); Declaration
of Sherry Pederson, par. 2; Pederson Deposition, pp. 30-31; see Pet. Br. 4
("A Human Resources representative ... determines whether a work-
place policy applies to the situation and orders appropriate action."),
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process. That was precisely the allocation of decisionmak-
ing roles in the leading Fourth Circuit decision of Hill v.
Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th
Cir. 2004) (en banc). Hil l theonlydecision made by th e
"actual decisionmakers" was to determine the level of
sanction. 16 The National School Boards Association repre-
sents that school boards virtually always limit their role in
disciplinary matters to selecting the appropriate sanction
based on the recommendation of and information provided
by school administrators. The Association insists that
school boards have no legal responsibility under Title VII
for any discrimination by those administrators. 17 Absolving
employers in this manner of responsibility for any and all
discriminatory actions occurring prior to the "ultimate
decision" will immunize from the prohibitions of Title VII
much, in some instances virtually all, invidiously motivated
conduct. As a district court judge required to administer the
Fourth Circuit’s ~’ultimate decisionmaker" standard re-
cently observed, "[t]he rule has the unfortunate potential to
create a safe harbor for workplace discrimination by any
16 The allegedly biased job site official was entirely responsible for
initiating the disciplinary actions (a flurry of misconduct charges
immediately following Hill’s complaint of discrimination), making the
relevant factual findings (allegedly knowingly inaccurate), and deter-
mining that the facts so found violated company rules. 354 F.3d at 282-
83 (majority opinion), 300-01 (dissenting opinion).
17 Brief of Amicus Curiae National School Boards Association in
Support of Petitioner, 4-5:
[M]ost school boards have no role in evaluating employees,
in investigating employee complaints, or in developing rec-
ommendations for.., discipline, or termination .... [S]chool
boards rely on the recommendations and input of adminis-
trators to inform their ... decisions .... [A] school board
will only act based on the facts presented to it.
(Footnote omitted).
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prejudiced supervisor who can fairly be described as not
being the final decisionmaker on personnel decisions."18
BCI insists that an employer could not permit the
"formal" decisionmaker to be the "conduit" of the biases of
other officials. (Pet. Br. 23, 47-48). But a decisionmaking
process in which different decisionmakers are responsible
for distinct decisions is by definition one in which the later
decisionmakers are conduits for the actions and purposes
of those who acted earlier. In this case Edgar worked 470
miles from the Albuquerque office; she had never met
Peters, did not have a copy of his personnel file, and
concluded (since it was Grado’s job to "present the facts")
that there was no need to hear Peters’ side of the story or
talk with Peter’s immediate supervisor, Katt. BCI insists
that Edgar was not ’~isolated" from what was really happen-
ing; as a practical matter, the "formal" decisionmaker in this
situation would hardly have been more isolated if BCI had
outsourced its personnel decisions to an office in Bangalore.
The problem, however, concerns not isolation but the very
nature of this type of decisionmaking process. Whenever an
employer takes action on the basis of a chain of decisionmak-
ing, the acts of an official who participates at an earlier stage
in the process always have the potential to turn the events
that follow into a conduit for achieving his or her purposes.
III. AN EMPLOYER IS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY THE DISCRIMI-
NATORY CONDUCT OF ITS AGENTS
Title VII imposes liability on an employer for an adverse
action brought about by the discriminatory conduct of one of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sawicki v. Morgan State Univer-
sity, No. 06-306, App. 20a.
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its agents. 19 When a biased supervisor personally decides
to fire a worker, the causal connection between that
decision and the resulting injury is obvious; the decision
causes injury because it invariably leads other officials to
take the specific acts which directly inflict harm - the
payroll department stops issuing paychecks and the front
desk or gate no longer permits the worker to enter the
office or plant. When the alleged discriminatory official did
not directly order the adverse action, the plaintiff must
make two specific demonstrations. First, the plaintiff must
prove that the biased official in question took some act
with a discriminatory purpose. 2° Second, the plaintiff must
19 In some situations the discriminatory conduct that brought
about the injury will itself have occurred so long before that injury that
it lies outside the 180 or 300 day charge filing period. If, as in Delaware
State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), the conduct mandates 
particular adverse action, which is postponed for some specific period of
time (in Ricks, for a year), the employee may have to file a charge
without awaiting that injury. Similarly, if (as in United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977)), the discriminatory conduct causes 
substantial injury at the time when it occurs (e.g., a discriminatory
layoff), the employee must file a charge at that point, and cannot do so
for the f~rst time only when subsequent developments give that
discriminatory act additional impact (e.g., a second layoffbecause of the
failure to accrue seniority during the first layoff period).
On the other hand, in some cases the initial discriminatory act may
have little or no practical consequence at the time, and may affect the
employee only because of subsequent developments. For example,
under a progressive discipline system, a worker might receive only a
letter of reprimand for his or her first infraction (an action with no
economic or other consequence), and later be fired because a subse-
quent infraction was his or her second. If in such a situation a worker is
cited for a first infraction by a discriminatory supervisor, Title VII does
not require the worker to file a charge with EEOC, and ultimately a
lawsuit, to challenge a discriminatory action which as yet has not had,
and might never have, any significant adverse impact.
s0 Under section 703(m) of Title VII, the plaintiff need only prove
that an invidious purpose was Ua motivating factor" behind the act in
(Continued on following page)
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demonstrate that this improperly motivated conduct
actually caused the adverse action that injured the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff must establish but-for causation: if the
improperly motivated conduct had not taken place, the
complained-of-injury would not have occurred.
Resolution of the issue of but-for causation will often
turn largely on the trier of fact’s assessment of the credi-
bility of the officials involved. The respective actions of
those various officials may consist of verbal exchanges (in
this case, a series of telephone calls), and all the relevant
witnesses are likely to be employees of the defendant.
Written allocations of decisionmaking roles may not exist,
and even if extant might not have been followed. In some
instances causation may depend largely on the thought
process of a particular official; did he or she, for example,
give any weight to the recommendation of another, alleg-
edly biased official? However specific, consistent, and self-
exonerating the testimony of the defendant’s officials, it
will usually be for the trier of fact to decide, at times based
largely on demeanor and cross-examination, whether their
testimony is to be believed. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000).
The circumstances of this case illustrate the critical
role of the trier of fact. On the day that Peters was dis-
missed on October 2, 2001, he was given a written state-
ment signed by Grado and Pederson explaining the
dismissal was based on his failure to come to work on
question. If the employer demonstrates that the discriminatory official
would for other reasons have taken the same act, even absent that
impermissible motivating factor, the employer is still liable, but the
remedies available are substantially limited. 42 U.S.C. § 706(g)(2)(B).
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September 30. 21 That same explanation was repeated on
October 16, 2001, in a written statement submitted by
Pederson to the New Mexico Department of Labor. 22 In
November 2001, Edgar wrote to the EEOC offering a
second, perhaps more persuasive account, stating that
Peters was fired because, having promised to bring Peder-
son and Grado a note from his physician, Peters failed to
do so. ~s In July, 2002, Edgar gave the EEOC a third,
possibly even more convincing explanation, insisting that
Peters was dismissed because Grado concluded that Peters
had lied to Katt about being sick on Sunday, September
30.~4 Finally, in February 2004, Edgar signed, in support of
BCrs motion for summary judgment, a statement with yet
a fourth account, explaining that she had fired Peters
because his remarks to Edgar on Friday, September 28
were an act of insubordination. The 2004 declarations by
Edgar and Grado regarding their respective roles in the
decisionmaking process are consistent with Edgar’s 2004
account of why Peters was dismissed, but not with Edgar’s
July 2002 explanation, with Edgar’s November 2001
explanation, with Pederson’s October 2001 explanation, or
~1 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B-3. The
notice, evidently written by Grado, stated ’q explained how [the order to
work on September 30] was a direct order and failure to comply with
the directive would be considered insubordination .... You did not
report on Sunday 9-30-01, and therefore your employment is being
terminated for insubordination."
Plaintiff EEOC’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgement, Exhibit I ("[Peters] was told by Cesar Grado
that if he didn’t show up, it would be considered insubordination.").
Id., Exhibit J (’2~r. Peters told Mr. Grado and the local HR
Administrator, Sherry Perderson, in a meeting that he had a doctor’s
note, but he did not provide one.").
See n.8, supra.
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with the explanation set forth in the dismissal statement
signed in October 2001 by Grado and Pederson.
BCI’s summary judgment motion relied heavily on the
type of interested, unverifiable testimony which the trier
of fact, although permitted to accept, is not required to
believe. In declarations filed some three years after Peters
was dismissed, Edgar and Grado provided (largely for the
first time) pointedly detailed descriptions of exactly what
they had said to one another in private telephone conver-
sations on September 28 and October 1, 2001. 25 Edgar and
Grado also swore to highly nuanced accounts of their
respective motives in each of those conversations. 2e BCI
repeatedly insists that all this self-exonerating testimony
was "undisputed." (Pet. Br. 11, 15, 37, 39). It is, of course,
true that no one but Edgar and Grado was on the phone
during the critical conversations, and that only Edgar and
Grado, respectively, had personal knowledge of what was
25 According to those accounts, Grado offered no recommendations,
made no requests regarding how Peters was to be dealt with, never
disparaged Peters, only asked Edgar for help in solving his staffing
problem, and did not "confer" with Edgar about whether or how Peters
should be disciplined. (Pet. Br. 8, 9 n.4, 25). For her part, Edgar
assertedly never asked Grado’s views about the matter, and carefully
instructed Grado to find out if Peters had called in to Katt about being
absent on September 30. (Pet. Br. 9, 25).
~ Grado insisted that when he first called Edgar his sole purpose
was to seek advice about his authority to order Peters to work on his
day off, that he never envisioned or intended that the call would lead to
any disciplinary action (Pet. Br. 37, 39, 49), and that at no point in any
of the conversations did he intend to influence what Edgar would
decide. (Pet. Br. 24). Edgar recalled with equal clarity that it was she
who concluded, from the fact that Peters had called Katt rather than
Grado, that Peters was not really sick (Pet. Br. 11, 25-26; but see n.8,
supra), and that she decided to fire Peters because of insubordinate
remarks on Friday, September 28, not because he failed to go to work on
Sunday, September 30. (Pet. Br. 26 n.9, 27 n.10).
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on her or his mind during those critical days. But that
circumstance does not provide the solution to this contro-
versy; rather, it frames the very problem that the trier of
fact must resolve. Were such self-serving statements about
matters known directly only to the defendant’s own em-
ployees deemed conclusive, few Title VII claims would ever
survive to trial. Reeves makes clear that it is ordinarily for
the trier of fact to decide whether such accounts are
reliable and credible, or are merely clever after-the-fact
explanations contrived to explain why a worker who had
permission from his supervisor not to work on Sunday,
September 30, and who was in fact sick on that day, was
nonetheless later told that he was being fired for not
working on September 30.
BCI contends that, regardless of the nature of a
discriminatory official act or the way in which it might
tend to lead to an adverse action, there is one method by
which an employer always can prove that that discrimina-
tory act did not cause any subsequent adverse action; the
employer need only demonstrate that the final decision-
maker made an "independent evaluation" of the facts.
(Pet. Br. 48). The Tenth Circuit took a different approach,
holding that an employer always can prove that an alleged
discriminatory act did not cause a subsequent adverse
action by demonstrating that the final decisionmaker
made an "independent investigation" of the relevant facts.
(Pet. App. 21a). Neither of these proposed per se rules
adequately takes into account the wide variety of ways in
which such a discriminatory act would lead to the dis-
missal of, or some other adverse action against, an em-
ployee.
There are, to be sure, situations in which a finding
that the final decisioumaker made such an independent
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evaluation would demonstrate the lack of the requisite
causation. If the sole alleged discriminatory act was a
biased recommendation that an employee be dismissed, an
employer would prevail if the trier of fact concluded that
the ultimate decisionmaker had expressly disregarded any
recommendations, and had made an independent, de novo
evaluation of the evidence and appropriate sanction. But
such an independent evaluation would be entirely ineffec-
tive in breaking the causal connection if the discrimina-
tory action at issue consisted of providing the final
decisionmaker with false inculpatory evidence. (Regard-
less of whether a jury independently evaluates the evi-
dence before it, a conviction would not be valid if the
defendant was arrested, searched and prosecuted because
of his race, or if the prosecutor knowingly introduced
highly inculpatory perjured testimony.)
Similarly, an independent investigation would break
the causal connection if the discriminatory act was provid-
ing inaccurate information, and that independent investi-
gation led the ultimate decisionmaker to disregard that
misinformation, and to base an adverse decision on other,
untainted evidence. But such an independent investiga-
tion would be beside the point if the discriminatory act
was not providing false information but making a biased
recommendation (e.g., to fire rather than merely repri-
mand the worker), and the ultimate decisionmaker - after
personally looking into the facts - gave dispositive weight
to that tainted recommendation.
In all cases, exculpatory evidence proffered by an
employer to show that the adverse action was not caused
by an earlier discriminatory act must specifically address
the particular type of discriminatory act alleged, and the
3O
manner in which that act assertedly brought about the
disputed adverse action.
Where an employer confers upon a given official the
authority to take a significant step in the disciplinary (or
other decisional) process, and the official uses that author-
ity to take a discriminatory act likely to cause injury, it
will not invariably be the case that a second official - at a
later point in the process - will be able to remove the
resulting taint of the decisionmaking process. In the
instant case, for example, the government contends that
Grado engaged in race-based selective reporting, notifying
Edgar that Peters had refused to work on a weekend, even
though Grado would not have so reported a white or
Hispanic worker who had done the same thing. If such
selective reporting indeed occurred, nothing thereafter
done by some other BCI official could eliminate the but-for
causation; if Peters had been white or Hispanic, Edgar
would not have been called, Grado would not have issued
an ultimatum, Pederson would never have been asked to
pull Peters’ old file, and no one would have questioned
Peters’ bona tides when he called in sick. BCI, having
opted to give Grado control over whether to take the steps
that would trigger a disciplinary process, cannot complain
if as a practical matter no other official was thereafter in a
position to undo the resulting impact of that biased act on
the decisionmaking process. Under Title VII, unlike
friendly games of golf, there are no mulligans.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the decision of the court of
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